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Haddon: A History and Explanation of Montana Disciplinary Practices

RECENT DECISIONS
A HISTORY AND EXPLANATION OF MONTANA DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES.The Supreme Court of Montana possesses authority to suspend, disbar,
or otherwise regulate and discipline Montana attorneys. The disbarment
statute, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 93-20261 provides:
"The supreme court of the state shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
remove or suspend attorneys and counselors at law. . .

."

This statute

contains five subdivisions, any violation of which may be grounds for
suspension or disbarment. 2 The court has also recognized its inherent
power, over and above any statutory provisions, to control its own
officers. 3 Thus, the court has ample power and authority "to adopt,
promulgate, and enforce all necessary and proper rules for ...

of attorneys in the state of Montana.

'4

regulation

In January, 1962, for the first time in more than twenty years, the
Supreme Court of Montana took disciplinary action against a Montana
attorney. 5 Since that time the court has considered five additional
'Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are cited as R.C.M.
'R.C.M., 1947 § 93-2026 provides for suspension or disbarment of an attorney for any
of the following causes:
1. His conviction for a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude,
in which case the record of conviction is conclusive evidence.
2. Wilful disobedience or violation of an order of the court requiring him to
do or forbear an act connected with, or in the course of his profession, which
he ought in good faith to do or forbear, and any violation of the oath taken
by him, or of his duties as such attorney and counselor.
3. Corruptly or wilfully and without authority appearing as attorney for
a party to an action or proceeding.
4. Lending his name to be used as attorney and counselor by another who
is not an attorney and counselor.
5. Being guilty of deceit, malpractice, crime, or misdemeanor, involving
moral turpitude; provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall
not abate any proceedings now pending, but the same may be proceeded with
until the final determination in the court wherein such action is pending.
There have apparently been no cases arising under the prohibitions of subdivisions
3. and 4., but the court has, in several cases, outlined the scope of the other subdivisions.
In In re McCue, 80 Mont. 537, 261 Pac. 341 (1927), subdivision 2. of R.C.M.
1947, § 93-2026 was directly interpreted by the court. There it was held that the
whole of the subdivision was modified by the term "wilful".
Subdivision 5. has been interpreted as being broad and comprehensive. It includes within its scope sufficient grounds for suspension or disbarment of any
attorney who displays a "course of conduct . . . disclosing the moral obliquity and
dishonesty rendering him unworthy of the privilege of practicing law."I In re 0 'Keefe,
55 Mont. 200, 204, 175 Pac. 593 (1918). It is broad enough to include all kinds of
felonies and misdemeanors involving moral turpitude, whether committed within the
jurisdiction (Montana), and whether within or without the sphere of official duty.
In re Thresher, 33 Mont. 441, 84 Pac. 876 (1906).
NOTE: The scope of subdivision 1. of R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2026 will be considered
in the main body of the note in connection with cases of disbarment following conviction for a felony or nisdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
'In In re Hansen, 101 Mont. 490, 501, 54 P.2d 882 (1936), the court, in refusing to
be limited to the statutes as authority to discipline attorneys, stated: "Attorneys
are officers of the court; they may be admitted to practice only by authority of the
court; and it is universally held that courts have inherent powers over members of
the Bar over and above statutory provisions."
'In re Unification of the Montana Bar, 107 Mont. 559, 562, 87 P.2d 172 (1939).
'In the Matter of Hirst, 140 Mont. 91, 368 P.2d 157 (1962). Prior to the Hirst case
the last disciplinary action considered by the Montana Supreme Court had been In re
McDonald, 112 Mont. 129, 113 P.2d 790 (1941).
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disciplinary cases. 6 Three of the cases resulted in disbarment of the
attorney involved, 7 while in the remaining three the attorneys were suspended for either definite or indefinite periods.8 These cases reflect the
increased concern of the Montana Supreme Court, as well as Montana
lawyers and the lay public of the state, with the ethical standards of
the legal profession in Montana. In considering a recent proposal to
adopt the Intergrated Bar in Montana the Supreme Court of Montana
spoke of a need for improvement of the Bar: ".

.

. we believe it is timely

to look forward to improvement of the Bar itself. There is need for
improvement in our court, in the district and justice courts, and in the
Bar of which we are members." (Emphasis added.) 9
The objective of a disbarment proceeding is to insure protection
of the public 10 and to "meet and clear away the alleged reprehensible
acts charged as having been committed by a member of [the] bar."' 11 2
From the earliest cases of disciplinary action against Montana lawyers
the Montana Supreme Court has emphasized that all attorneys must, as
individuals and in their professional lives, be fair and upright in dealings
with their clients and with the public. 1 3 The attorney is an officer of
the court and owes a duty to it to assist in the administration of justice.
14
If he fails in that duty he forfeits the privilege of practicing law.
Whenever an attorney exhibits personal attributes deemed detrimental to
the practice of his profession, the court has readily declared that such an
individual should not be allowed to continue to practice,' 5 but should be
expelled "from the profession whose honor he has stained and whose
reputation for fidelity his malpractice tends to impair."' 6 However,1 7 the
It
court has not been unmindful of the consequences of disbarment.
has always insisted that the procedures followed and the evidence in
support of the charges be sufficient to satisfy the court to a reasonable
certainty that the charges are true.' 8
eIn the Matter of Meyer, 141 Mont. 167, 377 P.2d 364 (1962) ; In the Matter of
Crawford, 141 Mont. 185, 380 P.2d 664 (1962) ; In the Matter of Harper, 141 Mont.
483, 380 P.2d 663 (1963) ; In the Matter of O'Doilnell, 387 P.2d 303 (Mont. 1963)
In the Matter of Coyle, 390 P.2d 209 (Mont. 1964).
'In the Matter of Crawford, supra note 6; In the Matter of Harper, supra note 6;
In the Matter of O'Donnell, supra note 6.
SIn the Matter of Hirst, supra note 6 (suspension for ninety days) ; In the Matter of
Meyer, supra note 6 (suspension for indefinite period) ; In the Matter of Coyle, supra
note 6 (suspension for indefinite period).
9
Application of the Montana Bar Ass'n. for the Unification and Integration of the
Bar of the State of Montana, 140 Mont. 101, 109, 368 P.2d 158 (1962).
101n re Thresher, supra note 2; In re McDonald, supra note 5.
nIn re Hansen, supra note 3 at 498-499.
"In re Bloor, 10 Mont. 222, 25 Pac. 101 (1891); State ex rel. Hartman v. Cadwell, 16
Mont. 119, 40 Pac. 176 (1895).
13In re O'Keefe, supra note 2.
4Id. at 205.
"In re Weed, 26 Mont. 241, 245, 67 Pac. 308 (1902).
"In re Burke, 55 Mont. 303, 305, 176 Pac. 421 (1918).
17' 'The
effect of the disbarment of attorneys practically means their complete ruin."
State ex rel. Stapleton v. Wines and Booth, 21 Mont. 464, 465, 54 Pac. 562 (1898).
" [An attorney's] disbarment deprives him, not only of his chosen means of making
a livelihood for himself and family, but of the confidence and respect of his fellows
S. . " In re Peters, 73 Mont. 284, 288, 235 Pac. 772 (1925).
IR.C.M., 1947, §§ 93-2016 to -2018, and §§ 93-2028 to -2038 outline the procedural
steps followed in any disbarment action other than one arising under subdivision 1.
of R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2026. These procedures are generally divisible into four steps:
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The disciplinary actions taken against attorneys of this state have
been the result of charges arising from a variety of conduct, both in
the practice of law and in personal activity apart from the practice of
law. Although the cases do not lend themselves to well ordered classification, they do tend to fall within one of three broad catagories.
1. Disbarment following conviction for a felony or misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude.
2. Disciplinary actions arising from conduct or condition of the
attorney apart from his professional responsibilities.
3. Disciplinary actions arising from conduct of the attorney in
performance of his professional duties.19
1. INITIATION OF THE ACTION-FILING OF COMPLAINT
Proceedings for suspension or removal of an attorney may be undertaken on
the basis of matters within the knowledge of the court or upon the information of a complaining witness or witnesses. (R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2028). If
the proceedings are upon the information of an individual, the accusation
must be in writing, and must be verified by affidavit that the charges are
true. (R.C.M., 1947, §§ 93-2029, 2030). There is no requirement that the
complainant be authorized by law to inform the court of the charges. In re
Wellcome, 23 Mont. 140, 58 Pac. 45 (1899). No other limitations are
imposed upon whom may bring a disciplinary action against an attorney
except that the person making the affidavit must have knowledge of the
facts upon which the affidavit is based. Accusations based on rumor or
hearsay will not be considered. In re Weed, 26 Mont. 241, 67 Pac. 308
(1902). Additionally, accusations which are vague, indefinite or uncertain
will not be considered. In re Wellcome, supra.
2. INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES
After the initial complaint is filed an investigation is made of the charges.
(R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2016). This investigation is made by either the attorney
general or a special investigator appointed by the attorney general or the
supreme court. (R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2018). If a special investigator is
appointed, it is the practice to name an attorney of known ability and
integrity to make the investigation. It is also customary to choose an attorney who resides at some distance from the scene of the alleged improper
activity. In re McCue, supra note 2.
3. SUMMONS AND ANSWER
Upon completion of the investigation, if, in the opinion of the attorney
general or the justices of the supreme court, there should be a trial, a
formal complaint is filed by the attorney general and a summons is issued
in the manner provided in a civil action. (R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2017); In the
Matter of O'Donnell, supra note 6. The accusation can be answered by
objecting to its sufficiency or by denying it. (R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2033).
The objection to sufficiency of the accusation need be in no particular form,
provided it sufficiently sets forth the grounds. A denial can be oral and
without oath. (R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2034). If the accused does not appear and
answer the charges against him the court may proceed and determine the
charges in his absence. (R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2032) ; In the Matter of Crawford, supra note 6.
4. TRIAL AND JUDGMENT
If the accused answers and denies the accusation, there must be a trial of
the issues before any judgment can be entered. (R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2036).
In the proceedings the attorney "is presumed innocent and presumed to have
properly performed [his] duties as [an] officer of the court . . . ."

In

re

Parsons, 35 Mont. 478, 482, 90 Pac. 163 (1907). However, since a disbarment action is not a criminal proceeding, the accused is not absolutely entitled to be confronted with witnesses against him under the MONT. CONST.
art. III, § 16. In re Wellcome, 23 Mont. 259, 58 Pac. 711 (1899). If the
accused pleads guilty or refuses to answer, the court must proceed to a
judgment of removal or suspension. (R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2036) (Emphasis
added). If a trial of the charges is held, the court may, upon conviction,
impose judgment according to the gravity of the offense. (R.C.M., 1947, §
93-2038).
9
Cases in this catagory have resulted in two types of sanction: (1) suspension, and
(2) disbarment.
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1.
Disbarment following conviction for a felony or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude is completely controlled by statute. In such cases the
court is not faced with any particular problems. A certified copy of
20
the record of conviction is conclusive evidence of such conviction,
and the court will not look beyond the fact of conviction to determine
whether the accused is actually guilty. 21 It is not necessary to issue any
citation to the attorney of the proceedings to disbar him, nor is he
entitled to have a complaint or accusation served upon him. 22 The court
acts on its own motion in ordering the disbarment.2 3 The court has no
discretion, but must order the attorney stricken from the rolls. 24 The
only instance in which the accused attorney might be entitled to a hearing before disbarment under subsection 1 of R.C.M. 1947, see. 93-2026
for conviction for a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude
would be when some question arose as to whether the offense involved
25
moral turpitude.
2.
In only limited instances has disciplinary action been instituted for
conduct or condition of the attorney apart from his professional responsibilities. Such conduct has almost always involved criminal or quasicriminal acts, and in dealing with the problem the court has relied
largely on subdivision 5 of R.C.M. 1947, sec. 93-2026 which embraces
acts of deceit, malpractice, crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. 26 In In re Wellcome, 27 the first Montana case within this catagory,
the court recognized that subdivision 5. was broad enough to include
felonies or
misdemeanors committed by the attorney outside his official
28
capacity.
In the early cases, if the questioned conduct involved the commission of a crime, the court often refused to consider the accusations
-R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2026, subd. 1., supra note 2. Upon conviction of an attorney for
a crime involving moral turpitude the clerk of the court in which the conviction
was had, must, within thirty days of the conviction, transmit to the supreme court
a certified copy of the record of the conviction. (R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2027).
The conviction may be in either state or federal court. In re Peters, supra note 17.
Additionally, the crime upon which conviction is based could have been committed
either before or after admission to practice. In re Wellcome, 23 Mont. 140, 58 Pac.
45 (1899).
mIn re Bloor, 21 Mont. 49, 52 Pac. 779 (1898).
In re Peters, supra note 17.
1n re Bloor, supra note 22.

24

'1Moral turpitude, within the meaning of 93-2026, has been defined as "everything
done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals." In re Peters, supra note 17 at
289.
2As originally enacted, subdivision 5. did not contain the clause "involving moral
turpitude." Montana Code of Civil Procedure, 1895, § 402. This subdivision was
amended to its present form in 1903. Laws of Montana 1903, ch. 36, § 1. Prior to
this amendment the Montana Supreme Court had held no moral turpitude was required
for disbarment under this section. In re Wellcome, supra note 21.
nSupra note 21.
2'Crimes committed outside the state also fall within the scope of this subdivision.
re Wellcome, supra note 21.
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in the disbarment action until after the attorney had been prosecuted for
the crime. 29 However, such a procedure has always been within the
discretion
of the court and seems to have been abandoned in more recent
30
cases.
In other cases involving unofficial conduct where the attorney has
been found guilty of wilful perjury, 31 or where he knowingly and wilfully
aided a litigant in establishing a false claim by acting as a witness in
the action,32 the court has held disbarment was justified. Disbarment
has also been ordered in a case where the attorney had defrauded a bank
3
by securing additional credit through the use of a forged deposit slip. 3
Prior to the two recent cases that ordered suspension of the attorneys
because of their disordered state of mind,34 the court had shown an
extreme reluctance to pass judgment on any extra-official conduct of a
lawyer which reflected on other than his personal or professional
integrity. 35 However, these recent cases seem to indicate an increased
readiness on the part of the court to deal with such extra-official conduct.
Although the per curiam opinions do not completely clarify the court's
position on "moral deficiency" 36 as a basis for disciplinary action, they
do show that the court has the power and the responsibility to suspend
an attorney who is unable to properly carry on his duties as an officer
of the court and a representative of clients' interests.
3.
The most serious, and unfortunately the most frequent, causes for
disciplinary action have stemmed from conduct of the attorney in perMont. 507, 68 Pac. 1115 (1902). In
the first Wellcome case, the court refused to consider the disbarment charges because
no criminal action had been taken. A grand jury in Lewis and Clark County subsequently failed to return an indictment against Wellcome on the bribery charges, (In
re Welcome, 23 Mont. 213, 58 Pac. 47 (1899)); even so, in a later action Wellcome
was disbarred. In re Wellcome, 23 Mont. 450, 59 Pac. 445 (1899).
301n re Young, 77 Mont. 332, 250 Pac. 957 (1926).
"In re McCue, 77 Mont. 47, 248 Pac. 187 (1926). Upon petition for re-admission,
McCue was able to explain all charges against him and was readmitted to practice.
In re MeCue, supra note 2.
32n re O'Keefe, supra note 2.
13In re Young, supra note 30.
UIn the Matter of Meyer, supra note 6; In the Matter of Coyle, supra note 6. In each
of these cases the order of suspension made reference to charges which had been
filed against the attorney. However, neither of the orders explained the nature of
the charges which initiated the action.
"'In In re McCue, supra note 2, the court expressly refused to take the position that,
if the moral deficiencies of the attorney had been properly argued as a basis for
disbarment, it would have considered such as being a sufficient basis for such action.
The court quoted favorably from the dissent of Justice Field in Ex parte Wall, 107
U.S. 265 at 306 (1882) wherein he stated: '"Indulgence in vices affecting to some
extent the moral character, but not the personal or professional integrity is not
a sufficient ground for disbarment."
Adoption of this position by the court is
especially significant when considered in light of the conduct attributed to McCue.
Conduct involving moral deficiency was described by Justice Meyers who dissented
in McCue: 'As to the specifications of the issuance of worthless checks, the attempted explanation of the accused makes the offense worse . . . .The circumstances
under which the accused did it, as explained by him (doing it while under the influence of bootleg whiskey, in a gambling joint, with intent, apparently, to fleece somebody and get some dishonest money in a crooked card game) only aggravates the
offense in my opinion. ' ' Supra at 572.
"See supra note 35 for examples of "morally deficient" conduct.
2In re Wellcome, supra note 21; In re Weed, 26
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formance of his professional duties. These cases cover a wide range of

unprofessional conduct, 37 and in many instances the attorney was charged
with multiple acts of malpractice. However, almost all these cases have
one feature in common-the action taken against the attorney was at
least partially due to misuse of a client's funds.
Suspension Cases
Not all the cases within the category of professional misconduct
have resulted in disbarment of the attorney. In several instances the
presence of mitigating circumstances influenced the court to suspend an
attorney rather than disbar him. An attorney who had collected money
for a client but had not paid it over was suspended because of his lack
of "evil intent" to permanently appropriate the funds to his own use.35
In another case an attorney, who had promised to pay a substantial sum
to two witnesses in order to secure their presence at the trial and their
favorable testimony, was only suspended for his actions. His plea of
having acted only in his client's interests was a sufficient mitigating
39
circumstance to prevent imposition of disbarment.
In other cases involving the mishandling of clients' funds, factors
such as the continued employment of the attorney by the client, 40 the
4
hardship to other clients resulting from a long period of suspension, 1
and even the economic pressures under which attorneys worked during
the depression 42 have been taken into consideration by the court in
determining the sanction to be imposed. It should be noted that in each
of these cases there was either a repayment of the money involved or
an offer to repay. The court has never allowed suspension if repayment
43
has not been made.
Disbarment Cases
Misappropriation of funds held by an attorney in a fiduciary capacity
does not, as seen from the suspension cases, always result in disbarment.
In addition to recognition of various mitigating factors the court has, in
the past, imposed other limitations upon disbarment proceedings. It
37

Some examples of the professional misconduct which have been the subject of
disciplinary action are: acting as counsel for both parties in a law suit. (In re Carleton, 33 Mont. 431, 84 Pac. 288 (1906)) ; failing to follow the client's instructions in
the settlement of its claim, (In re Waddell, 54 Mont. 597, 172 Pac. 1036 (1918));
and failure to pay over money collected for the client, (In re Hansen, supra note 3.)
'In re Burke, supra note 16.
'In re O'Keefe, 49 Mont. 369, 142 Pac. 638 (1914). The suspension imposed in this
action apparently made no lasting impression on Mr. O'Keefe. He was subsequently
disbarred for giving false testimony in a divorce action with the intent to deceive
the court. In re O'Keefe, supra note 2.
'In re Jewell, 60 Mont. 602, 201 Pac. 266 (1921).
'In re Lunke, 56 Mont. 226, 182 Pac. 126 (1919).
'State ex rel. Foot v. Hughes, 92 Mont. 53, 10 P.2d 584 (1932).
'On only one occasion has disciplinary action been taken against an attorney acting
as an officer of the state for misuse of his official capacity. In that case, In re
Bunston, 52 Mont. 83, 155 Pac. 1109 (1916), a county attorney had used his office
as a means of securing settlement of various civil claims that lie handled in his
private practice. The evidence indicated that the attorney had resorted to threats of
prosecution, filing of complaints, and even arrest and committment in forcing settlement of the claims. He was suspended for one year for his actions.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol25/iss2/5
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has held that the withholding of a client's funds must not only be wilful,
by a dishonorable intent before disbarment
but must also be accompanied
44
action will be taken.
Prior to the recent disbarment actions, the cases which have resulted
in actual disbarment have involved either a refusal by the attorney to
pay over money owing to the client, 45 or a lack of effort to settle with
the client until after some official complaint against his conduct was
made or actual disciplinary proceedings were instituted. 46 In one of the
recent cases the attorney apparently did not attempt to make any restitution of the clients' funds, 47 but in the other two there was either a
repayment 48 or an offer to make the deficiencies good. 49 Although such
repayment has, in the past, been at least a partial basis for imposing suspension rather than disbarment, the court in the recent cases gave no
weight to it. In fact, in one case the court expressly stated that although
an offer to repay was to the attorney's credit, disbarment was nevertheless merited in view of his 50actions amounting to deceit and malpractice
involving moral turpitude.

The Montana Supreme Court until recently has been reluctant to
take action against unethical conduct. The recent cases mark the first
action in the entire field in twenty years, and as yet the court has not
acted except in those cases where the attorney has engaged in some sort
of gross misconduct or criminal act involving moral turpitude. The
recent cases do not mark a radical departure from earlier precedent, but
they do indicate that the court has resumed its responsibility to deal with
this difficult problem, and that it is now taking a more comprehensive
view of the entire problem of unethical conduct. In two of the suspension cases the court based its decision on grounds which, prior thereto,
had not been the basis for such action; and in the disbarment cases the
court emphasized not only its own responsibility to the public, but also
the position which an attorney of this state holds as an officer of the
court.
It is submitted that the language of the past decisions and of the
statutes does, in fact, offer ample precedent for a comprehensive treatment of any disciplinary problems which will face the court in the
future:
1. The comprehensive nature of subdivision 5. of R.C.M. 1947, sec.
93-2026 has been recognized as applicable to acts falling both within
and without the scope of the attorney's professional duties.
re McCue, supra note 2.
re Stevens, 92 Mont. 549, 16 P.2d 410 (1932). In this case the client had agreed
to accept a settlement of five hundred dollars for a total of over one thousand

4In
4In

dollars which Stevens owed. Stevens, however, paid no more on this settlement
agreement than he had paid on the original amount due and owing.

46See, e.g., In re Waddell, 54 Mont. 597, 172 Pac. 1036 (1918); In re MeCue, supra
note 31; In re Hansen, supra note 3.
47
1n the Matter of Crawford, supra note 6.
"In the Matter of O'Donnell, supra note 6.
41In
the Matter of Harper, supra note 6.
"0In ordering the disbarment the court also cited its public trust and the fact that
the lawyer had breached his duties as an attorney as reasons for taking such severe
action. In the Matter of Harper, supra note 6.
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2. The definition of moral turpitude adopted by the court is broad
enough to include any unjust, immoral, or dishonest act by the attorney.
3. Subdivision 2. of R.C.M. 1947, sec. 93-2026 provides for disciplinary action for any wilful violation of the attorney's oath of office.
4. The court has the inherent power to regulate its officers and
to promulgate and enforce all necessary and appropriate rules for such
regulation.
SAM E. HADDON

INFORMING JURY OF DEFENDANTS'
MENT

OF

TRIAL

PURSUANT

TO

PRIOR CONVICTIONS AT COMMENCE-

HABITUAL

CRIMINAL

STATUTE

VIOLATED

DUE PRocEss.-Defendant was charged in three seperate indictments for
state narcotics violations. As defendant had previously been convicted
for narcotics violations, the state sought to increase punishment under
Maryland's habitual criminal statute.' Each of the three indictments
alleged the facts of the principal offense and also the details of the
prior convictions. At the beginning of the trial the complete indictments
were read to the jury, and during the trial the prior convictions were
proven. The jury convicted the defendant of the principal crimes, and
found the prior convictions to exist as an historical fact. Pursuant to
these findings, the trial court sentenced defendant as a third offender.
Appealing these convictions to the Maryland Court of Appeals, defendant
contended that it was improper to acquaint the jury with his criminal
record at the outset of the trial. This contention was rejected,2 and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.3 Defendant then petitioned the federal district for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he
had been deprived of a fair and impartial trial as required by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The petition was denied
on the basis of Maryland decisions upholding the procedure of informing
the jury of previous convictions during the trial for the principal
offense. 4 On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, held,
reversed. Informing the jury of defendant's prior criminal record at
the outset of the trial destroyed the jury's impartiality. Such procedure
is prejudical to the defendant and renders the conviction invalid.
Lane v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963).
Nearly all states have enacted habitual criminal statutes which provide that prior convictions can be used to increase punishment for a
subsequent offense.5 In Montana, for example, if a person has a previous
conviction for an offense punishable by five years imprisonment, his
sentence for a subsequent conviction is increased to a minimum of ten
'MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 300 (1957) provides that a sentence is to be increased on
a subsequent conviction for narcotics, where defendant has prior narcotics convictions.
2This was one of ten assignments of error presented on appeal. The convictions were
affirmed in Lane v. State, 226 Md. 81, 172 A.2d 400 (1961).
'368 U.S. 993 (1962).
'Lane v. Warden Md. Penitentiary, 207 F. Supp. 780 (D.C. Md. 1962).
'For a list of these jurisdictions see 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 645 (12th ed.
1955).
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